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HOW DIVERSITY CAN REDEEM THE 
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS STANDARD:  
MOUNTING AN EFFECTIVE TITLE VII DEFENSE 
OF THE COMMITMENT TO DIVERSITY 
IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
Stacy Hawkins* 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article undertakes an analysis, both quantitative and qualitative, of 
the developing body of Title VII diversity law.1  The jurisprudence of 
 
*  Assistant Professor, Rutgers School of Law–Camden.  I would like to thank the Rutgers 
Camden Junior Faculty for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this 
Article, as well as the participants of the colloquium on The Challenge of Equity and 
Inclusion in the Legal Profession:  An International and Comparative Perspective held at 
Fordham University School of Law.  For an overview of the colloquium, see Deborah L. 
Rhode, Foreword:  Diversity in the Legal Profession:  A Comparative Perspective, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2241 (2015). 
 
 1. The term “diversity law” or “diversity jurisprudence” is meant to refer to the 
developing body of law in which an interest in racial, ethnic, gender, and other types of 
demographic diversity as a means of achieving instrumental goals, such as improved student 
learning or better preparation for, or performance of, work, is asserted as a legal justification 
or defense for the consideration of race, ethnicity, and/or gender in contexts and under 
circumstances where such consideration would otherwise be prohibited by law. See Stacy L. 
Hawkins, A Deliberative Defense of Diversity:  Moving Beyond the Affirmative Action 
Debate to Embrace a 21st Century View of Equality, 2 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 75 (2012) 
(discussing the development of the U.S. Supreme Court’s diversity jurisprudence in equal 
protection law).  The two most common legal proscriptions on the use of race, ethnicity, 
and/or gender in response to which an interest in “diversity” has been asserted as a legal 
justification for permitting the use of race, ethnicity, and/or gender are the prohibitions on 
their use under the Equal Protection Clause and under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012) (prohibiting the consideration of race, 
color, religion, sex, and national origin in employment); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 
(1976) (prohibiting gender classifications under equal protection except when justified by 
important government interests); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) 
(declaring the uses of race and national origin constitutionally “suspect” under the Equal 
Protection Clause and generally proscribing their use).  Generally, the most common 
justification for permitting the use of race, ethnicity, and/or gender in these contexts is 
remedying past discriminatory conduct. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 
639–42 (1987) (permitting the use of gender in selection for employment to correct for past 
exclusionary practices); United Steelworkers, Inc. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) 
(permitting the use of race in selection for a workplace training program to correct for past 
discriminatory practices); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 328 (1978) 
(Blackman, J., concurring) (acknowledging that remedying past institutional discrimination 
could justify the use of race in admissions); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316–18 
(1977) (permitting the consideration of gender in the calculation of social security benefits to 
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diversity was first developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in equal protection 
cases,2 but it has not been confined to that context.  In particular, lower 
federal courts have been adjudicating cases asserting an interest in diversity 
as a means of challenging or justifying race/ethnicity- or gender-conscious 
policies and/or practices under Title VII.3  These cases have given rise to a 
body of Title VII diversity law that has remained largely unexplored in the 
scholarly literature.4  Because these cases have gone largely unnoticed, they 
 
correct for past discrimination in employment).  Under both of these bodies of law (equal 
protection and Title VII), courts have begun to develop a diversity jurisprudence 
adjudicating the permissibility of using race/ethnicity and/or gender as a means of achieving 
instrumental, rather than remedial, institutional goals. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 
328–33 (2003) (asserting that an interest in student body diversity should sustain the use of 
race/ethnicity in college and university admissions, notwithstanding the fact that race is a 
“suspect classification” and therefore generally proscribed under equal protection, because 
of the educational benefits that flow from such diversity); Mlynczak v. Bodman, 442 F.3d 
1050, 1054 (7th Cir. 2006) (asserting that the interest in ensuring a diverse applicant pool 
justified active recruitment of women and minority candidates notwithstanding the 
prohibitions on the use of race and gender under Title VII); Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 
F.3d 1111, 1114–15 (7th Cir. 2003) (asserting that an interest in a diverse police force, 
which enhances operational efficacy in racially and ethnically diverse neighborhoods, should 
permit the consideration of race in the selection of police offers by the Chicago Police 
Department notwithstanding the prohibitions on the use of race under equal protection).  
These cases form the body of developing “diversity law.” 
 2. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326; Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 552 (1990); 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 281.  In Bakke, a white male plaintiff challenged the race-conscious 
admissions program employed by the University of California Davis Medical School as a 
violation of his right to equal protection. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269–70.  Although a majority of 
the Court voted to strike down the race-conscious admissions program because it amounted 
to an impermissible racial quota system, Justice Powell’s plurality opinion suggested that 
race could be a legitimate factor in college admissions decisions if the purpose was to obtain 
the educational benefits that flow from student body diversity, if the consideration of race 
were sufficiently individualized, and if other safeguards ensured that its use was consistent 
with equal protection. See id. at 311–15.  In Metro Broadcasting, a majority-owned 
broadcast station challenged the minority preference policies, adopted by the FCC to 
increase the diversity of programming content, as a violation of equal protection. Metro 
Broad., 497 U.S. at 552.  The Court upheld the minority preference policies finding that the 
interest in programming diversity was sufficiently important to justify the use of race under 
the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 567–68.  Although Metro Broadcasting has been 
overruled insofar as the Court applied an intermediate standard of review in that case, see 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (finding that the strict scrutiny 
standard of review applies to all uses of race under the Equal Protection Clause), the Court 
has not had any occasion to consider the question of whether the interest in programming 
diversity might satisfy the higher strict scrutiny standard of review.  In Grutter, a white 
female plaintiff challenged the race-conscious admissions program employed by the 
University of Michigan Law School as a violation of her right to equal protection. Grutter, 
539 U.S. at 316.  Adopting the reasoning articulated by Justice Powell in Bakke, a majority 
of the Court found that the interest in student body diversity is sufficiently compelling to 
justify the use of race in college and university admissions so long as the use of race 
otherwise satisfies the strict scrutiny requirement that it be narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest. Id. at 329–33.  For further discussion of the jurisprudence of diversity developed in 
these three cases, see Hawkins, supra note 1. 
 3. See discussion infra Part II. 
 4. There are some student notes that, in trying to predict the impact of Grutter on Title 
VII law, analyzed some of the employment cases decided in the immediate aftermath of 
Grutter. See, e.g., Daniela M. de la Piedra, Note, Diversity Initiatives in the Workplace:  The 
Importance of Furthering the Efforts of Title VII, 4 MOD. AM. 43 (2008) (discussing post-
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have not been mined for any guidance they might offer to employers 
generally, and legal employers specifically, on how best to structure 
workplace diversity efforts to minimize the risk of legal liability under Title 
VII and, conversely, to maximize their Title VII defense.  This Article 
surveys these cases and offers an analysis that seeks to:  (1) situate this 
developing body of diversity law within the existing Title VII landscape, 
and (2) inform the development of legally defensible workplace diversity 
programs. 
This analysis is motivated by, and responsive to, three intersecting 
concerns.  The first concern is the continuing debate within the legal 
community about how we ought to define and justify the profession’s 
commitment to diversity.  Despite a longstanding commitment to diversity, 
we continue to debate the justifications for this commitment.5  This debate 
often pits the “moral case” for diversity against the “business case” for 
diversity.6  Notwithstanding this debate, an analysis of the decided Title VII 
diversity cases reveals that it matters less, in terms of legal defensibility, 
how diversity efforts are justified in principle than how they operate in 
practice.7  In light of this, it bears considering whether we ought to refocus 
some of our deliberation away from the ongoing debate about why we 
should be committed to diversity in the profession and toward consideration 
of how we should operationalize that commitment.  Rather than, or perhaps 
in addition to, focusing on why we pursue diversity, the suggestion here is 
that we engage ourselves more actively in exploring how we might pursue 
the commitment to diversity in the legal profession in ways that do not 
unnecessarily increase the risk of legal liability, which might dampen these 
efforts.8 
 
Grutter cases in defense of employer diversity efforts); Jared M. Mellott, Note, The Diversity 
Rationale for Affirmative Action in Employment After Grutter:  The Case for Containment, 
48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1091 (2006) (discussing post-Grutter cases addressing 
consideration of diversity interest under Title VII and suggesting limitation of Title VII to 
remedial rationale).  However, legal scholars have not yet turned their attention to this 
developing body of law as a whole. 
 5. See, e.g., Eli Wald, A Primer on Diversity, Discrimination, and Equality in the Legal 
Profession or Who Is Responsible for Pursuing Diversity and Why, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
1079 (2011); David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is 
Good for Business”:  The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the 
Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548 (2004). 
 6. See Wald, supra note 5, at 1081.  The primary arguments in this debate are:  (1) the 
legal profession should be committed to diversity in the profession because it is the “right 
thing to do” in view of the profession’s long history of exclusion, particularly of women and 
racial/ethnic minorities, and (2) the legal profession ought to pursue diversity because it is 
the “smart thing to do” in view of a changing marketplace and increasing demands by 
corporate clients for diverse teams capable of responding to that changing marketplace. 
Douglas E. Brayley & Eric S. Nguyen, Good Business:  A Market-Based Argument for Law 
Firm Diversity, 34 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 9–10 (2009).  These two arguments are often referred 
to in shorthand as the “moral case” for diversity, i.e., it is the “right thing” to do, and the 
“business case,” i.e., it is the “smart thing” to do. Id. at 3 (“Moral arguments for diversity are 
shifting to market-based arguments. . . .  that diversity is good for business.”). 
 7. See discussion infra Part II. 
 8. See discussion infra Part II. 
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The second concern follows from the first.  Regardless of how the 
commitment to diversity is justified, there is significant uncertainty and 
confusion about the legality of workplace diversity efforts as they have 
been articulated and/or adopted by the legal profession.9  In particular, the 
commitment to diversity within the legal profession in large part entreats 
legal employers to adopt policies and practices that foster the hiring, 
retention, promotion, and advancement of women and minority attorneys, 
among others.10   Attendant to this commitment, legal employers face 
increasing demands from external stakeholders to produce demonstrable 
evidence of success in achieving these diversity goals.11  The need and/or 
 
 9. In my twelve years of diversity practice prior to teaching law, I commonly 
encountered two extreme, contradictory, and almost certainly wrong perceptions about the 
legal defensibility of workplace diversity efforts generally.  The first is that workplace 
diversity efforts are not subject to the prohibitions of Title VII, which are presumed to 
extend only to more traditional affirmative action efforts and otherwise remedial uses of 
race, ethnicity, and/or gender in the workplace, rather than the more instrumental uses of 
race, ethnicity, and/or gender proffered in support of diversity. See Hawkins, supra note 1, at 
80–90 for a discussion of the difference between affirmative action and diversity.  The 
second perception is that diversity efforts are categorically prohibited under Title VII unless 
they can be defended under the standards applicable to traditional affirmative action plans. 
See Curt A. Levey, The Legal Implications of Complying with Race- and Gender-Based 
Client Preferences, 8 ENGAGE 14, 16 (2007), available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/library/doclib/20080314_CivRightsCurtLevey.pdf.  It seems likely that neither of 
these perspectives is entirely right but that the reality of the legal defensibility of workplace 
diversity efforts lies somewhere between these extremes.  This Article attempts to respond to 
these opposing views by outlining the contours of the legal analysis applicable to workplace 
diversity efforts. 
 10. The American Bar Association (ABA) adopted Goal IX in 1986 to promote the “full 
and equal participation in the legal profession by minorities, women, persons with 
disabilities, and persons of differing sexual orientations and gender identities.” Goal III 
Report, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/disabilityrights/initiatives_awards/ 
goal_3.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2015).  Since that time, various state and local bar 
associations, as well as other professional associations of lawyers, have adopted similar 
commitments to enhance the full and equal participation by women and racial and ethnic 
minority attorneys, among others, in the legal profession, including, for instance, the 
Pennsylvania Bar Association, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the Bar 
Association of San Francisco, the Boston Bar Association, and the Colorado Bar 
Association, just to name a few. See, e.g., ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., 
STATEMENT OF DIVERSITY PRINCIPLES (2003), available at http://www.nycbar.org/images/ 
stories/pdfs/diversity/statement-of-diversity-principles.pdf.  In 1999, then–BellSouth General 
Counsel Charles Morgan, on behalf of roughly 500 corporate counsel, urged outside law 
firms to embrace this commitment to diversity. See Charles R. Morgan:  Leading General 
Counsel—And Their Law Firms—Up the Path to Diversity, METRO. CORP. COUNS., Mar. 
2006, at 47.  In 2004, then Sara Lee General Counsel, Roderick Palmore, extended this 
commitment by asking his fellow corporate counsel to “pledg[e to] make decisions regarding 
which law firms represent [their] companies based in significant part on the diversity 
performance of the firm” and, likewise, to “end or limit [their] relationships with firms 
whose performance consistently evidences a lack of meaningful interest in being diverse.” 
RICK PALMORE, A CALL TO ACTION:  DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 1 (2004), 
available at  http://www.acc.com/vl/public/Article/loader.cfm?csModule=security/ 
getfile&pageid=16074.  Within a year, seventy-two companies had signed on to the more 
aggressive proposal. See Melanie Lasoff Levs, Call to Action—Sara Lee’s General Counsel:  
Making Diversity a Priority, DIVERSITY & B., Jan./Feb. 2005, available at 
http://www.mcca.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewpage&pageid=803. 
 11. These pressures emanate from a number of sources, including the organized bar 
(Austin Minority Bar Association Law Firm Diversity Report Card), law students (Law 
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desire to satisfy these external demands for diversity has created 
considerable pressure on legal employers, law firms in particular, and has 
sometimes caused them to engage in questionable diversity practices.12  
Some of these practices have generated widespread concern for, and in 
some cases outright threats of litigation challenging, their legality under 
Title VII.13  So the second aim of this Article is to determine the legal 
defensibility of the various practices employed most often by law firms, 
among others, to increase their diversity. 
The final aim of this Article is to engage those scholars who have 
criticized Title VII, in particular the prevailing McDonnell Douglas 
standard.14  This critique condemns the McDonnell Douglas standard for its 
 
Students for a Better Profession), the legal media (The American Lawyer Diversity 
Scorecard), and in-house counsel (A Call to Action).  For example, Wal-Mart, which is well 
known for its commitment to the diversity of outside counsel, has been both lauded and 
criticized for its requirement that each of its outside law firms identify both a woman and a 
minority for consideration as the relationship partner for its business. See Angela Brouse, 
Comment, The Latest Call for Diversity in Law Firms:  Is It Legal?, 75 UMKC L. REV. 847, 
848 (2007); Clare Tower Putnam, Comment, When Can a Law Firm Discriminate Among Its 
Own Employees to Meet a Client’s Request?  Reflections on the ACC’s Call to Action, 9 U. 
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 657 (2007).  This demand is likely related to Palmore’s Statement of 
Principle, see PALMORE, supra note 10, urging corporate counsel to make decisions about 
outside counsel based on their diversity performance.  The proliferation of diversity surveys 
on behalf of bar associations and the legal media have also contributed to these external 
pressures, which are not necessarily limited to law firms. See, e.g., PA. BAR ASS’N, 
COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION:  19TH ANNUAL REPORT CARD (2013), available 
at http://www.pabar.org/pdf/PBAWIPReportCard19Apr2013.pdf (reporting the gender 
diversity of various sectors of the legal profession, including the state and federal judiciary, 
the bar association, and private practice).  There additionally have been calls by the 
organized bar and others for law firms to tie diversity management to partner compensation 
in an effort to ensure adequate accountability for improving workplace diversity. See, e.g., 
PRESIDENTIAL DIVERSITY INITIATIVE, ABA, DIVERSITY IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION:  THE NEXT 
STEPS 16 (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
diversity/next_steps_2011.authcheckdam.pdf (acknowledging with approval that “some law 
firms have begun to tie employees’ compensation to their demonstrated commitment to 
diversity in recruiting, mentoring, and work assignments); Roy Strom, Strengthening the 
Business Case for Diversity, CHI. LAW. (July 2012), 
http://www.chicagolawyermagazine.com/Archives/2012/07/Business-Case-For-
Diversity.aspx (indicating that a client request for production inquired whether outside 
counsel was willing to “tie a portion of your compensation to achieving diversity staffing 
commitments”).  I discuss the legal defensibility of these various efforts below. See 
discussion infra Part II. 
 12. The pressure is particularly intense as the demand increasingly comes from clients. 
See supra note 10. 
 13. Curt Levey has sent letters to a number of law firms demanding that they refrain 
from certain diversity practices or risk the threat of litigation. See also Charles A. Sullivan, 
Circling Back to the Obvious:  The Convergence of Traditional and Reverse Discrimination 
in Title VII Proof, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1031, 1035 (2004) (acknowledging that “EEOC 
filings increasingly challenge reverse discrimination”). 
 14. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of 
the Law, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1589, 1591 (2001) [hereinafter Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric] 
(citing diversity as both a potential benefit and a threat to the extension of legal protections 
for groups who have traditionally experienced discrimination in the workplace and for whose 
benefit civil rights laws, such as Title VII, were presumably enacted); Lauren B. Edelman et 
al., When Organizations Rule:  Judicial Deference to Institutionalized Employment 
Structures, 117 AM. J. SOC. 888, 901 (2011) (studying the wide berth of judicial deference to 
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increasing failure to protect women and racial/ethnic minorities from 
workplace discrimination.15  It also rejects the developing jurisprudence of 
diversity for its perceived inability to fill the growing gap between the 
workplace harms suffered by women and racial/ethnic minorities and the 
protection of law afforded to them under Title VII.16  This Article attempts 
to redeem the McDonnell Douglas standard by demonstrating that it is a 
viable means of defending workplace diversity efforts, which are often 
viewed as beneficial for women and racial/ethnic minorities, against reverse 
discrimination challenges.17  The successful defense of these voluntary 
workplace diversity efforts has become a critical strategy for vindicating the 
employment rights of women and racial/ethnic minorities as the success of 
more traditional litigation strategies has waned.18 
This Article is divided into three parts.  Part I provides an overview of 
the existing landscape of Title VII law, identifying those places where there 
is critical intersection with the developing body of diversity law.  Part II 
then surveys the developing Title VII diversity law, offering both a 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of relevant cases in an effort to 
synthesize this area of the law before applying it to the issue of law firm 
diversity efforts.  Part II then offers some practical guidance for how law 
firms might structure their diversity efforts to minimize the risk of legal 
liability and maximize their legal defense.  Finally, Part III forecasts how 
this developing body of diversity law might redeem the McDonnell 
Douglas standard by altering the legal landscape of Title VII in a way that 
favors the interests of racial/ethnic minorities and women in the workplace. 
I.   THE PREVAILING LEGAL STANDARDS 
To situate the developing Title VII diversity law within the existing Title 
VII landscape, it is necessary to first survey the existing landscape.  Title 
VII is the federal law that makes it an “unlawful employment practice” for 
any employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”19  A plaintiff 
alleging a violation of Title VII may prove discrimination by the direct 
 
employers in Title VII cases); Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313, 315, 
388 (2010) (complaining that “[p]laintiffs have a hard row to hoe in proving unlawful 
discrimination” and that “[c]ourts protect employers from the stigma of discrimination . . . 
[c]asting employers as inclusive, benevolent, and fair”). 
 15. See Martin, supra note 14. 
 16. See Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric, supra note 14. 
 17. Workplace diversity efforts are not universally viewed as beneficial for woman and 
racial/ethnic minorities. See, e.g., Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 
2223 (2013) (lamenting that diversity tokenizes minority groups for the sake of financial 
gain largely for the benefit of white male individuals and institutions). But see Stacy L. 
Hawkins, Selling Diversity Short:  An Essay Responding to Nancy Leong’s “Racial 
Capitalism,” 40 RUTG. L. REC. 68, 74 (2013) (responding to Leong by arguing that diversity 
is, or at least has the potential to be, more beneficial than harmful to minorities). 
 18. See supra note 14. 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
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method of proof, in which case the plaintiff must offer evidence from which 
a trier of fact could conclude without inference that the challenged 
employment action was taken because of unlawful discrimination.20  This 
direct method of proof, however, is difficult to sustain, and plaintiffs rarely 
pursue it.21  Alternatively, the plaintiff may prove unlawful discrimination 
using the indirect method of proof.  Pursuant to this method of proof, the 
plaintiff must offer evidence from which a trier of fact could infer that 
unlawful discrimination more likely than not motivated the challenged 
employment action.22  If the plaintiff offers proof of unlawful 
discrimination under Title VII using the indirect method, the McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting framework applies.23  This burden-shifting 
framework operates as follows.  First, the plaintiff/employee is required to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.24  This burden is minimal; 
the plaintiff/employee need only offer evidence that:  (1) he/she is in a 
protected class or, in the case of some reverse discrimination claims, that 
background circumstances demonstrate that the defendant is the unusual 
employer who discriminates against the majority;25 (2) he/she was qualified 
for the position sought (in the case of failure to hire/promote) or met the 
employer’s legitimate expectations (in the case of termination or 
discipline); and (3) similarly situated employees were treated differently or 
 
 20. See Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 137 (5th Cir. 2003); Sinio v. McDonald’s 
Corp., No. 04 C 4161, 2007 WL 869553, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2007) (“The direct method 
of proving unlawful discrimination requires that the plaintiff offer evidence [that] . . . if 
believed, proves that the employer’s actions were motivated by discriminatory intent without 
reliance on inference or presumption.”). 
 21. See infra Table 1 (demonstrating that only three of forty-four cases studied involved 
claims of direct evidence of discrimination).  However, as demonstrated by the survey of 
decided diversity cases below, plaintiffs were more likely to pursue this direct method of 
proof when there was evidence that the challenged employment action was taken pursuant to 
an affirmative action plan (AAP). See infra Table 1.  This is because affirmative action 
plans, particularly when they arise from litigation resulting in a consent or settlement decree, 
often permit the conscious consideration of race/ethnicity or gender by employers in hiring 
or promotion decisions. See Xerox, 347 F.3d at 137 (“The existence of an affirmative action 
plan . . . when combined with evidence that the plan was followed in an employment 
decision is sufficient to constitute direct evidence of the unlawful discrimination unless the 
plan is valid.” (quoting Bass v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 256 F.3d 1095, 1110 (11th Cir. 
2001))); see also Humphries v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 580 F.3d 688, 693 (8th Cir. 
2009); Murray v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 2011 WL 382694, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2011); 
Rogers v. Haley, 421 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1365 (M.D. Ala. 2006). 
 22. DeBiasi v. Charter Cnty. of Wayne, 537 F. Supp. 2d 903, 921 (E.D. Mich. 2008) 
(“[T]he plaintiff must present evidence ‘which tends to prove that an illegal motivation was 
more likely than that offered by the defendant.’” (quoting Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock 
Chem. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994))). 
 23. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 24. See id. 
 25. Only some jurisdictions require that reverse discrimination plaintiffs demonstrate 
“background circumstances” in order to establish a prima facie case. See, e.g., Mastro v. 
PEPCO, 447 F.3d 843, 851 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that a reverse discrimination plaintiff 
“must show ‘additional background circumstances that support the suspicion that the 
defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority’” (quoting Parker 
v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir.1981))); see also Sullivan, supra note 
13, at 1065–71 (discussing the origins of the “background circumstances” requirement and 
its adoption and rejection by various courts). 
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the adverse action was taken under circumstances giving rise to an 
inference of discrimination.26  Assuming the plaintiff/employee establishes 
a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the 
defendant/employer, who must offer some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the challenged employment action.27  This is a burden of 
production, not of proof.28  Thus, at this stage, the defendant/employer need 
only articulate a reason for the challenged employment action and need not 
convince the trier of fact that this was the real reason for the challenged 
action.29  If the defendant/employer satisfies this burden of production, the 
burden shifts back to the plaintiff/employee, who must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the reason articulated by the 
defendant/employer is a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination.30  The 
plaintiff/employee maintains the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of 
fact that unlawful discrimination more likely than not animated the 
employer’s action.31  The plaintiff may satisfy this burden by once again 
proffering either direct evidence or indirect/circumstantial evidence of the 
employer’s discriminatory intent.32  As during the initial stage of proof, 
direct evidence of discriminatory intent, or the proverbial “smoking gun,” is 
often lacking, and plaintiffs are forced to rely on indirect or circumstantial 
evidence of the employer’s discriminatory intent at this third stage of 
proof.33  Evidence that the employer’s proffered legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory business reason for the challenged action is unworthy of 
belief, otherwise known as proof of “pretext,” may be sufficient indirect 
evidence to infer discrimination.34 
At the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 
framework, the defendant-employer can assert as a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory business reason for the challenged employment action 
either that some consideration other than race, ethnicity, and/or gender 
motivated the challenged action or that the employer acted pursuant to a 
valid affirmative action plan (AAP) when considering race/ethnicity or 
 
 26. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 803. 
 29. Id. at 804. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 807. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Here again, however, if plaintiffs have relied on the existence of an AAP as a basis 
for the challenged employment action, the plaintiff may well proffer the AAP as direct 
evidence of unlawful discrimination where the defendant/employer is unable to demonstrate 
the validity of the AAP pursuant to the Weber standard. See Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 
130, 137 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The existence of an affirmative action plan . . . when combined 
with evidence that the plan was followed in an employment decision is sufficient to 
constitute direct evidence of the unlawful discrimination unless the plan is valid.” (quoting 
Bass v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 256 F.3d 1095, 1110 (11th Cir. 2001))). 
 34. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 806; see also Plumb v. Potter, 212 F. App’x 472, 
479 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[Plaintiff] can show pretext . . . by showing that the proffered reason 
had no basis in fact; . . . did not actually motivate the [employer’s] conduct; or . . . was 
insufficient to warrant the challenged conduct.”). 
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gender.35  If the defendant/employer asserts that it acted pursuant to an 
AAP, the defendant/employer will be required to prove the validity of the 
AAP by meeting the standard first set out in United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber36 and later affirmed in Johnson v. Transportation 
Agency.37 
In Weber, a white steelworker was passed over for a union training 
program that reserved half of the available training slots for black 
steelworkers in an attempt to remedy past discriminatory union practices.38  
In upholding the voluntary affirmative action plan against a Title VII 
challenge, the Supreme Court declared that, notwithstanding the general 
prohibition on the consideration of race in making employment decisions, 
Title VII does permit employers to voluntarily adopt affirmative action 
plans that seek to eliminate traditional patterns of racial segregation in the 
workplace.39  To do so, the employer must satisfy the predicate burden of 
proving that there is a “manifest racial imbalance” in the composition of the 
workforce.40  Then the employer must demonstrate that such affirmative 
action has been undertaken in a manner that does not “unnecessarily 
trammel the interests of the [nonminority] employees.”41  The Johnson 
 
 35. See United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 94 (2d Cir. 2011) (recognizing that “[t]he 
Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the ‘affirmative action’ defense . . . is properly 
raised at the second step of the McDonnell Douglas framework”). 
 36. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).  Weber addressed the use of voluntary affirmative action to 
cure a racial imbalance in the employer’s workforce. Id. at 208. 
 37. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).  Johnson extended to gender the principles announced in 
Weber. Id. at 627. 
 38. Weber, 443 U.S. at 198–99. 
 39. Id. at 208. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.  In Weber the manifest imbalance was established by proving that despite a local 
labor force that was 39 percent black, the composition of the skilled workforce at Kaiser was 
only 1.83 percent black. Id. at 198–99.  The Court found that the plan did not unnecessarily 
trammel the interests of nonminorities by reserving half of the skilled craft training slots for 
blacks, because it did not “create an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees.” 
Id. at 208.  The Court further noted that the plan was permissible because it was only a 
temporary measure “not intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a 
manifest racial imbalance.” Id.  The Weber standard is analogous to the equal protection 
strict scrutiny standard applicable to race-conscious action pursuant to a voluntary AAP, and 
courts have often treated such claims arising under both Title VII and equal protection the 
same. See, e.g., Oerman v. G4S Gov’t Solutions, No. 1:10–1926–TLW–PJG, 2012 WL 
3138174, at *4 (D.S.C. July 17, 2012) (noting that, although the constitutional principles are 
stricter than those of Title VII, “some of the tenets overlap and they are often addressed 
together”); Murray v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, No. 06 C 1372, 2011 WL 382694, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 
Jan. 31, 2011) (observing that “the standards for proving discrimination that apply to Title 
VII are essentially the same as those applicable to [equal protection] employment 
discrimination claims”); Perrea v. Cincinnati Pub. Sch., 709 F. Supp. 2d 628, 646 (S.D. Ohio 
2010) (determining that on an equal protection challenge to an AAP “a plaintiff asserting a 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim . . . must prove the same elements required to 
establish a disparate treatment claim under Title VII” (quoting Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 
597, 601 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted))).  The strict scrutiny standard 
requires that any race-conscious action challenged under equal protection first be justified by 
some “compelling interest” and second be “narrowly tailored” to meet that interest. See 
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (applying standards analogous to Weber 
despite the case being considered under equal protection rather than Title VII).  For instance, 
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Court affirmed this standard and broadened the permissible scope of 
voluntary AAPs to include gender affirmative action.42  Although the 
Supreme Court has consistently reinforced this standard, the likelihood of 
success in defending these voluntary AAPs has arguably diminished under 
the Court’s most recent precedent.43  Although the Court expressly 
disclaimed that the more rigorous standard of proof announced in Ricci v. 
DeStefano44 was intended to eliminate voluntary, affirmative action such as 
 
the “compelling interest” proffered in support of a voluntary affirmative action plan under 
equal protection is usually an interest in “remedying past . . . discrimination,” which is 
comparable in kind and proof to the “manifest imbalance” standard of Weber/Johnson. Id. at 
166.  Similarly, the “narrow tailoring” requirement under equal protection often has been 
defined as coextensive with the Title VII prohibition on “unnecessarily trammeling.” Id. at 
177–78 (finding that the one-for-one promotion requirement at issue was permissible 
because it was “flexible,” not serving as a bar to the advancement of whites, and 
“temporary”); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 294 (1986) 
(considering the burden imposed on nonminorities from the preferential layoff policy at issue 
and finding the burden too heavy, especially where it was designed to “maintain” rather than 
attain racial balance).  Thus the Weber/Johnson and equal protection standards can fairly be 
considered together when evaluating the legitimacy of an employer’s voluntarily adopted 
AAP. 
 42. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 641–42.  Johnson was denied a promotion by his employer, 
who defended the selection of a woman on the ground that the employer was operating 
pursuant to a voluntary AAP designed to cure the gender imbalance of its workforce. Id. at 
619–24.  The imbalance was proven with evidence that none of the positions in the job 
category sought by Johnson were held by a woman. Id. at 636.  The voluntary AAP adopted 
to cure this imbalance satisfied the requirement that it not “unnecessarily trammel the rights 
of [other] employees” by not setting aside any particular number of positions for women, but 
fixing both long- and short-term goals for improving the gender representation of the 
workforce and only permitting the consideration of gender, among other qualifications, in 
selecting for the position. Id. at 637–38. 
 43. See, e.g., Paradise, 480 U.S. 149; Wygant, 476 U.S. 267. But see Ricci v. DeStefano, 
557 U.S. 557 (2009).  In Ricci, the Court ratcheted up the predicate burden of proof for 
sustaining an employer’s race-conscious action, including arguably when such action is 
taken to avoid a manifest imbalance in the workforce. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 585.  The New 
Haven Fire Department chose to adopt an affirmative, race-conscious remedy to redress 
what the employer believed would be a manifest imbalance in the promotion of firefighters 
to the positions of lieutenant and captain based on the administration of a written exam 
having a disparate impact on black and Hispanic candidates. Id. at 561–62.  As a predicate 
for the race-conscious action, the Court in Ricci ruled that the fire department was required 
to both offer proof of a manifest imbalance between the composition of the workforce and 
those eligible for promotion based on the written exam, and also establish by a “strong basis 
in evidence” that the written exam, despite its racially disparate impact, was not job-related 
or consistent with business necessity and that there were less discriminatory means of 
selecting for the promotion which the fire department had failed to implement. Id. at 582.  
The Ricci Court acknowledged the intersection of its holding with the standard applicable to 
voluntary affirmative action by proclaiming that the heightened standard of proof announced 
in Ricci “leaves ample room for employers’ voluntary compliance efforts” as sanctioned in 
Weber and Johnson. Id. at 583.  In an attempt to sort out the distinction between the new 
standard announced in Ricci and the prevailing Weber and Johnson standards, the Second 
Circuit in United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65 (2011), distinguished between prospective 
affirmative action, which that court said is governed by the Weber/Johnson standard, and 
retroactive affirmative action, which it said is governed by the Ricci standard. Id. at 102.  
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court would similarly cabin the 
effect of its holding in Ricci. 
 44. 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
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that permitted under the prevailing Weber and Johnson standards,45 legal 
scholars have criticized this decision as leaving little room for employers to 
engage in voluntary affirmative action without incurring legal liability 
under Title VII.46 
Within the context of this legal landscape, federal courts have begun to 
adjudicate claims challenging employers’ efforts to improve the “diversity” 
of their workforces.47  These challenges largely have been in the form of 
“reverse discrimination” cases prosecuted by white and/or male employees 
asserting that their employers’ interest in diversity caused them to 
unlawfully consider race, ethnicity, and/or gender in hiring, termination, 
and/or promotion decisions.48  These cases have been considered under the 
prevailing Title VII standards, including both the McDonnell Douglas and 
the Weber/Johnson standards.49 
II.   ANALYSIS OF THE DECIDED DIVERSITY CASES 
There have been forty-four cases challenging workplace “diversity” 
efforts decided by federal district and circuit courts since Grutter v. 
Bollinger.50  Of these, twenty-two have been decided favorably to 
 
 45. Id. at 583. 
 46. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci:  Whitening 
Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. REV. 73, 159–60 (2010); Ann C. 
McKinley, Ricci v. DeStefano:  Diluting Disparate Impact and Redefining Disparate 
Treatment, 12 NEV. L.J. 626, 629 (2012).  Some scholars have even suggested that Ricci is 
an ominous sign for the Court’s treatment of diversity under Title VII. See Patrick Shin & 
Mitu Gulati, Showcasing Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1017, 1049 (2011) (“Ricci should 
chasten any expectation that the Court will take its next available opportunity to extend the 
diversity rationale for affirmative action to justify race-conscious employment action under 
Title VII.”). 
 47. For a discussion of the difference between the interest in “diversity” and traditional 
AAPs, see Hawkins, supra note 1. 
 48. Only four of the forty-four diversity cases identified did not involve a reverse 
discrimination challenge. See Moranski v. Gen. Motors Corp., 433 F.3d 537, 539 (7th Cir. 
2005) (involving suit by a Christian employee arguing that the employer’s denial of a 
Christian affinity group constituted religious discrimination where the employer permitted 
affinity groups for women and minorities); Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 
601–02 (9th Cir. 2004) (involving argument by Christian employee that an employer 
discriminated against him on the basis of his religious beliefs by terminating him for 
condemning homosexuality in response to workplace diversity posters); Frank v. Xerox 
Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 133 (5th Cir. 2003) (involving suit by black employees against Xerox 
alleging that their balance workforce program, which identified blacks as overrepresented in 
some job categories, resulted in unlawful discrimination against blacks in promotion and 
pay); Sinio v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 04 C 4161, 2007 WL 869553, at *1, *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
19, 2007) (involving suit by an Asian American female alleging that her employer treated 
black employees more favorably by providing affinity groups for black employees to assist 
in their professional development but not providing a similar resource for Asian American 
employees).  The remaining forty cases involved reverse discrimination challenges by white 
and/or male employees alleging that the employer’s interest in workplace diversity resulted 
in unlawful discrimination. 
 49. Some have also been considered under equal protection, but for the reasons 
previously discussed, these cases can be analogized to those considered under the Title VII 
Weber/Johnson standard. See supra note 41. 
 50. 539 U.S. 306 (2003); see infra Tables 1–2.  A note on methodology:  these cases 
were identified by conducting a Westlaw search of employment discrimination cases 
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defendants, and nineteen have been decided favorably to plaintiffs, with 
three having mixed results.51  Of the twenty-two cases favorable to 
defendants, eighteen involved challenges to diversity plans pursuant to the 
McDonnell Douglas standard; while of the nineteen cases favorable to 
plaintiffs, fifteen involved challenges to voluntary AAPs (including those 
adopted pursuant to settlement/consent decrees), which are most commonly 
subject to the Weber/Johnson standard.52  Nineteen of the twenty-two cases 
involving challenges to diversity plans under the McDonnell Douglas 
standard were decided favorably to the defendant, which represents an 86 
percent success rate for employers.53  By contrast, of the twenty cases 
 
involving challenges to or defenses of ostensibly race/ethnicity- or gender-conscious action 
on the basis of the employer’s interest in workplace diversity.  Because of the overlap 
between the legal standards applicable to cases involving AAPs under both Title VII and 
equal protection, as discussed supra note 41, equal protection cases were included in this 
analysis if they involved race/ethnicity- or gender-conscious actions challenged or defended 
on the basis of the employer’s interest in workplace diversity.  Multiple cases involving the 
same parties were counted only once.  This analysis considers only those cases decided after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, because that case marks 
an important point in the Court’s diversity jurisprudence.  It is also used as the point of 
demarcation because it is the standard against which many predictions about the Court’s 
treatment of diversity efforts in the employment context have been measured. See, e.g., 
Cynthia Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, 7 GREEN BAG 2D 215 (2004); Helen Norton, 
Stepping Through Grutter’s Open Door:  What the University of Michigan Affirmative 
Action Cases Mean for Race-Conscious Government Decisionmaking, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 543 
(2005); Ronald Turner, Grutter, the Diversity Justification, and Workplace Affirmative 
Action, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 199 (2004); Rebecca Hanner White, Affirmative Action in the 
Workplace:  The Significance of Grutter?, 92 KY. L.J. 263 (2003). 
 51. See infra Table 1.  This simple quantitative analysis does not account for any 
selection bias arising from cases settled before decision. 
 52. See id.  Not all of these cases were decided exclusively under the Weber/Johnson 
standard.  Some were decided under the McDonnell Douglas test, and still others were 
decided under equal protection.  Nevertheless, all were understood to involve voluntary 
affirmative action and, therefore, invoke a more substantial burden of proof on the defendant 
employer to justify the use of race, ethnicity, and/or gender in the challenged employment 
decision than would otherwise be required under the McDonnell Douglas standard.  One 
notable observation from this analysis is the discrepancy between courts in how they treat 
and analyze claims of employment discrimination arising under both Title VII and equal 
protection.  It appears that, notwithstanding clear guidance and longstanding precedent in 
this area of law, there remain many courts that fail to fully comprehend how this law should 
be applied in individual cases. Compare Rudin v. Lincoln Land Comm. Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 
719 (7th Cir. 2005) (assessing reverse discrimination challenge under McDonnell Douglas 
standard even where evidence demonstrated the existence of an AAP), with Rogers v. Haley, 
421 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1369 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (applying McDonnell Douglas standard to 
reverse discrimination challenge to an AAP, but finding the AAP to constitute “direct 
evidence” of discriminatory intent), and Humphries v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 580 
F.3d 688, 692–93 (8th Cir. 2009) (acknowledging that an AAP might constitute “direct 
evidence” under the McDonnell Douglas standard but also permitting defendant to 
demonstrate the validity of the AAP under the equal protection and/or Weber/Johnson 
standard), and Finch v. City of Indianapolis, 886 F. Supp. 2d 945, 961, 966 (S.D. Ind. 2012) 
(requiring employer to satisfy equal protection and/or Weber/Johnson standard to defend an 
AAP in reverse discrimination case).  Notwithstanding these different standards of proof 
applied to the defendants, courts are uniformly more likely to hold the defendant/employer to 
a higher standard of proof in discrimination cases involving AAPs and are also more likely 
to sustain reverse discrimination challenges to AAPs when they allow for race- and/or 
gender-conscious action. 
 53. See infra Table 1. 
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involving challenges to AAPs (including settlement/consent decrees), 
fifteen were decided favorably to the plaintiff, which represents a 75 
percent loss rate for employers.54 
 
Table 1: 
Outcomes of Federal Cases Challenging Workplace Diversity Efforts 
 Plaintiff Defendant Mixed 
Favorable Decision 19 22 3 
AAP   8   3 1 
Consent Decree   7   0 1 
Diversity Plan   4 19 1 
Direct Evidence   2 (both AAP)   0 1 
McDonnell Douglas   8 (5 CD/AAP) 18 1 
Weber/Johnson   3   0 1 
Other   6   4 3 
 
Notably, eleven of the nineteen decisions favorable to plaintiffs were 
denial or reversal of summary judgment to defendant and not a final verdict 
or judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor.55  Whereas, twenty of the twenty-two 
decisions favorable to defendants were grants or affirmances of summary 
judgment/dismissal for defendants, and therefore reflect a more final 
disposition of the case in favor of defendants than those decisions favorable 
to plaintiffs.56  It also is notable that each circuit (either by district or circuit 
court opinion) has adjudicated a case involving an employer diversity plan, 
whether analyzed as a voluntary AAP or otherwise considered pursuant to 
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.57 
 
Table 2: 
Disposition in Federal Cases Challenging Workplace Diversity Efforts 
 Plaintiff Defendant Mixed 
Reverse SJ 6 0    0 
Affirm SJ 0 7    0 
Grant SJ 3 9 0.5 
Deny SJ 5 1 1.5 
Reverse Verdict 2 0    0 
Sustain Verdict 3 1    1 
Dismissal 0 3    0 
Other Disposition 0 1    0 
TOTAL 19 22    3 
 
 
 54. See infra Table 1. 
 55. See infra Table 2. 
 56. See infra Table 2. 
 57. See infra Table 3. 
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Table 3: 
Circuit Decisions in Federal Cases 
Challenging Workplace Diversity Efforts 
 Plaintiff Defendant Mixed 
D.C. Circuit 0 2 1 
1st Circuit 2 0 0 
2d Circuit 1 3 0 
3d Circuit 1 4 1 
4th Circuit 1 1 0 
5th Circuit 4 1 0 
6th Circuit 1 4 0 
7th Circuit 7 4 0 
8th Circuit 1 0 0 
9th Circuit 0 1 0 
10th Circuit 0 1 0 
11th Circuit 0 1 1 
Supreme Court 1 0 0 
TOTAL  19 22 3 
 
There are several general observations to be drawn from these cases.  
First, employers must sustain a high burden of proof when defending 
diversity efforts (often pursuant to an AAP) that involve the explicit 
consideration of race, ethnicity, and/or gender,58 whereas employers face a 
relatively low burden of proof when defending diversity efforts that are not 
explicitly race/ethnicity- or gender-conscious.59  The former often must be 
defended under the rigorous Weber/Johnson standard, whereas the latter 
most often will be considered under the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework, which requires the employer only to demonstrate some 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason for the challenged action.60  
This difference in proof produces a disparity in an employer’s likelihood of 
success when defending its diversity efforts against a reverse discrimination 
challenge, as demonstrated by the Tables above. 
Take, for example, the case of Finch v. City of Indianapolis,61 in which 
white police officers challenged the City of Indianapolis’s promotion of 
three African-American police officers out of rank order as unlawful under 
 
 58. Although the presumptive standard applicable to voluntary AAPs under Title VII is 
the Weber/Johnson standard, the lower federal courts have been inconsistent in their 
treatment of AAPs (including consent and settlement decrees) by applying the direct 
evidence standard, the equal protection standard, and sometimes even the McDonnell 
Douglas standard to these claims. See supra note 52.  However, notwithstanding the 
inconsistency in the standard applied, courts have uniformly demanded more rigorous proof 
by employers in defense of these race- and gender-conscious efforts than the proof 
demanded in defense of diversity efforts that are not viewed or classified as voluntary AAPs 
and that do not involve race- or gender-conscious efforts. 
 59. See infra note 77. 
 60. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 61. 886 F. Supp. 2d 945 (S.D. Ind. 2012). 
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Title VII.62  The city attempted to defend the promotion decisions by 
pointing to a prior consent decree requiring that black candidates comprise 
at least 25 percent of appointments to officer training until parity is reached 
in the workforce.63  The problem, however, was that the consent decree 
required the city to take affirmative steps to increase only the recruitment 
and hiring of minority officers, but not their promotion.64  Declining to find 
the prior consent decree applicable to the challenged promotion decisions, 
the court instead required the city to establish a separate predicate under the 
Weber/Johnson standard for the race-conscious promotion decisions.65  
Finding that the city could not satisfy the high burden of proof required to 
validate the AAP as it related to the promotion decisions, the court granted 
summary judgment to the plaintiffs.66 
Finch stands in contrast to Mlynczak v. Bodman,67 which involved a 
challenge by white employees to certain hiring and promotion decisions 
favoring women and minority candidates.  Although the plaintiffs in 
Mlynczak alleged that the hiring and promotion decisions were made 
pursuant to an AAP designed to promote workplace diversity, the outcome 
in this case was very different where the employer did not concede, as in 
Finch, that the promotion decisions were made on the basis of the race, 
ethnicity, and/or gender of the candidates.68  Rather, the employer in 
Mlynczak asserted that the AAP, although designed to promote diversity, 
involved only efforts to expand the pool of candidates for hiring and/or 
promotion and explicitly prohibited decision makers from basing hiring 
and/or promotion decisions on the forbidden characteristics of race, 
ethnicity, and/or gender, even as it encouraged and rewarded managers for 
their efforts to improve workplace diversity.69  The employer, therefore, 
was not subjected to the very high burden under Weber/Johnson of 
establishing the validity of the AAP, as the employer was in Finch.  Instead, 
 
 62. Id. at 952–53.  The officers also challenged this employment action under the Equal 
Protection Clause, but the court’s analysis of these two claims relies on the same evidence 
and similar legal burdens insofar as the requirement to offer both predicate proof of a 
remedial justification for the implementation of a voluntary AAP and to demonstrate that the 
plan does not inflict undue harm to the interests of whites. Id. at 974–77. 
 63. Id. at 956. 
 64. Id. at 955–56. 
 65. Id. at 960 (requiring separate proof of a manifest imbalance regarding promotions to 
sustain the plan). 
 66. Id. at 976 (noting only a “carefully designed” AAP can be sustained as valid and 
finding that the defendant employed an AAP “with no tie to any perceived past 
discrimination, no analysis of the present effects of any past discrimination, no evaluation of 
its necessity as a remedial measure, and no careful consideration of its impact on white 
candidates passed over for promotion”). 
 67. 442 F.3d 1050 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 68. Id. at 1058. 
 69. Id. at 1058–59.  The court noted that “[t]he existence of [an AAP] alone is not 
enough to permit a trier of fact to attribute [discrimination] to the decisionmakers,” finding 
instead that plaintiffs “must establish a link between the [AAP] and the [challenged] 
employment decision.” Id. at 1058.  The court concluded that such a connection was lacking 
in this case, where the evidence demonstrated both that the policy prohibited the 
consideration of race, ethnicity, and/or gender in hiring and promotion decisions and that the 
candidates chosen were selected on the basis of their superior qualifications. Id. at 1058–59. 
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the employer in Mlynczak was only required to proffer some legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory business reason for the challenged promotion decisions 
under the McDonnell Douglas standard.70  The employer was readily able 
to meet this standard by demonstrating the superior qualifications of the 
chosen candidates, notwithstanding the fact that they were all women 
and/or minorities.71 
As these two cases demonstrate, an employer is much less likely to 
prevail in a reverse discrimination challenge when the employer is required 
to meet the high burden of proof under the Weber/Johnson standard, 
because it has taken race/ethnicity- and/or gender-conscious action pursuant 
to an AAP.72  Conversely, an employer is much more likely to prevail in a 
reverse discrimination case when the employer is subject only to the 
McDonnell Douglas standard and is able to demonstrate that, 
notwithstanding an interest in improving workplace diversity, the 
challenged employment action can be defended on the basis of some 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason unconnected to the 
candidate’s race, ethnicity, and/or gender. 
Another general observation that can be drawn from an analysis of the 
decided Title VII diversity cases is that even cases subject to the McDonnell 
Douglas standard are not immune from reverse discrimination liability if 
they involve impermissible race/ethnicity- or gender-conscious actions.  In 
other words, it is the fact that an employment action is race/ethnicity- or 
gender-conscious, and not necessarily that it is taken pursuant to an AAP, 
that makes the action vulnerable to liability under Title VII.  Although those 
cases involving general policies or practices of promoting workplace 
diversity that were subject to review under the McDonnell Douglas 
standard were much more likely to withstand challenge than those 
involving AAPs and adjudicated under the Weber/Johnson standard (82 
percent decided favorably to defendant/employer versus the 75 percent of 
decisions involving race/ethnicity- or gender-conscious AAPs that were 
decided unfavorably to the defendant/employer), there were cases in which 
employers were held liable even under Title VII’s McDonnell Douglas 
 
 70. Id. at 1058. 
 71. Id. at 1059 (“[W]here an employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reason for its 
employment decision is that it selected the most qualified candidate, evidence of the 
applicant’s competing qualifications does not constitute evidence of pretext unless those 
differences are so favorable to the plaintiff that there can be no dispute among reasonable 
persons of impartial judgment that the plaintiff was clearly better qualified for the position at 
issue.” (quoting Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1180 (7th Cir. 2002))).  This burden 
was easily met by the employer because courts have routinely declined to subject an 
employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason to rigorous scrutiny, citing as a 
concern that “the court . . . not degenerate into . . . [a] super personnel department.” Id. at 
1060. 
 72. This is true even when those efforts are styled as, or defended on the basis of, an 
interest in diversity. See, e.g., Decorte v. Jordan, 497 F.3d 433, 441 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(affirming a jury verdict in favor of white plaintiffs challenging a diversity plan and finding 
it was not error for the trial court to treat the diversity plan as an invalid AAP because it was 
focused on achieving a desired racial balance within the workforce and took race-conscious 
action toward that goal). 
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standard for pursuing an interest in diversity in an impermissibly 
race/ethnicity- or gender-conscious way.73  Most of these cases turn on 
whether the plaintiff can demonstrate that the employer’s legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory business reason for the challenged action is a pretext for 
discrimination.74  Consequently, ensuring that the reasons for employment 
decisions are well-supported in fact, even when they are not race/ethnicity- 
or gender-conscious, can substantially improve the likelihood of success in 
defending those decisions against a reverse discrimination challenge. 
In addition to these general observations, there are several more discrete 
observations that are also worthy of note and that offer some practical 
guidance to employers, particularly law firms, on how to structure legally 
defensible workplace diversity efforts.  The sections below address several 
practices that are commonly employed by law firms, among other 
employers, as a part of their workplace diversity efforts.  These sections 
assess the likelihood of success in defending these practices against reverse 
discrimination challenges based on the decided Title VII diversity cases.  
After discussing their legal defensibility generally, I offer some additional 
guidance on how best to structure these practices to maximize a defense 
under Title VII and minimize the risk of employer liability associated with 
these practices. 
A.   AAPs 
Employers, including law firms, might be obligated to maintain AAPs or 
may voluntarily adopt AAPs because of a commitment to diversity.75  
 
 73. See, e.g., Clements v. Fitzgerald’s Miss., Inc., 128 F. App’x 351, 352–53 (5th Cir. 
2005) (finding employer liable under Title VII McDonnell Douglas standard where no 
evidence black woman was more qualified than the white male the employer was 
contractually obligated to hire); Sinio v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 04 C 4161, 2007 WL 
869553, at *13–16 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2007) (denying summary judgment in part to the 
defendant/employer and finding that the plaintiff could proffer direct evidence of 
discrimination based on:  (1) the suspicious timing of the employer’s actions in terminating 
the plaintiff and replacing her with a black employee, (2) the systematically better treatment 
of black employees, and (3) the implausibility of the employer’s asserted reason for 
termination); Groesch v. City of Springfield, No. 04-3162, 2006 WL 3842085, at *6–16 
(C.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 2006) (finding triable issues of fact, notwithstanding diversity interests, as 
to whether the reasons for disparate treatment of black and white officers in granting 
retroactive seniority upon rehiring was pretext for discrimination where circumstantial 
evidence included statements made in support of disparate treatment of an officer because of 
his race, additional evidence that the decision was made because of the officer’s race, and 
evidence demonstrating that favorable treatment could have been given to white officers 
without impairing the interest in diversity), rev’d on other grounds, 635 F.3d. 1020 (7th Cir. 
2011). 
 74. The suits in Groesch and Sinio were allowed to proceed to a jury on the question of 
the employer’s liability for reverse discrimination. See Sinio, 2007 WL 869553, at *6; 
Groesch, 2006 WL 3842085, at *16.  Clements upheld a verdict for the plaintiff where the 
employer, because of a contractual obligation to hire the plaintiff, was unable to proffer a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason for hiring a black woman in lieu of the white 
male plaintiff. See Clements, 128 F. App’x at 352–53. 
 75. A law firm, or other legal employer, may be obligated to maintain an AAP if it is a 
“government contractor,” as defined in Executive Order 11,246, subject to oversight and 
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AAPs can be ordered along a continuum ranging from set aside programs, 
as in Weber, to expanded outreach and recruiting programs, as in Mlynczak, 
with varying degrees of legal proof and defensibility associated with each, 
as outlined above.  Regardless of whether they are formally designated as 
AAPs, employment policies or practices that involve the conscious 
consideration of race, ethnicity, and/or gender in making employment 
decisions in an effort to achieve some identified numerical representation of 
women and/or minorities in the workforce must satisfy the very high 
Weber/Johnson burden of proof and are the least likely to be sustained 
against challenge.76  AAPs, however, that merely involve expanding 
outreach and recruiting to women and/or minorities, regardless of whether 
the impetus is to cure a manifest imbalance in the workforce or simply to 
promote diversity, are likely to be subject to the relatively low burden of 
 
reporting by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP). 41 C.F.R. § 60-
2 (2014). 
 76. Recall that this burden arguably has been increased under Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 
U.S. 557 (2009), for AAPs involving race- and/or gender-conscious actions as a means of 
achieving a desired representation of women and/or minorities in the workforce. See supra 
note 43; see also United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 134–40 (2d Cir. 2011) (reversing 
and remanding the decision of the district court finding the AAP valid under the 
Weber/Johnson standard in order to apply the additional requirements of Ricci in 
determining whether the AAP is valid); Dean v. Shreveport, 438 F.3d 448, 456–65 (5th Cir. 
2006) (reversing summary judgment for an employer that maintained separate, racial 
eligibility lists for entry-level firefighter positions, and finding that consent decree could not 
justify the AAP where there was no evidence of “lingering effects” during the relevant 
period to demonstrate predicate proof of a need for race-conscious hiring); Lomack v. City 
of Newark, 463 F.3d 303, 310–12 (3d Cir. 2006) (reversing judgment for the employer 
where the employer acted pursuant to a consent decree that was inapplicable to the 
challenged race-conscious transfer policy and could not otherwise demonstrate predicate for 
the AAP); Mastro v. PEPCO, 447 F.3d 843, 852–55, 860 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (reversing 
summary judgment for the employer where plaintiff proffered evidence of a prior consent 
decree and the employer admitted that it acted out of fear over controversy concerning black 
employees in terminating the plaintiff); Rudin v. Lincoln Land Comm. Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 
722–28 (7th Cir. 2005) (reversing summary judgment for the defendant and finding triable 
issues of fact where the employer acted pursuant to an AAP in hiring a minority candidate 
and failed to follow its own hiring procedures in doing so, resulting in inconsistent 
justifications for the hiring decision); Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 137 (5th Cir. 
2003) (reversing summary judgment for the employer and finding the jury may consider the 
use of explicit racial goals as proof of an AAP, and placing the burden on the employer to 
demonstrate the validity of the AAP); Oerman v. G4S Gov’t Solutions, Inc., No. 1:10-1926-
TLW-PJG, 2012 WL 3138174, at *7–9 (D.S.C. July 17, 2012) (denying the employer’s 
motion for summary judgment alleging that it acted pursuant to a valid AAP when using race 
as a “tiebreaker” in selecting a black employee over the plaintiff where both the AAP and 
OFCCP regulations expressly prohibited the use of race in hiring and promotion decisions); 
Rogers v. Haley, 421 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1369–70 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (finding a triable issue on 
the plaintiff’s reverse discrimination claim where employer erroneously believed that it was 
required to promote a less-qualified black applicant over the white plaintiff pursuant to the 
consent decree); White v. Alcoa, Inc., No. 3:04-CV-78 RLY/WGH, 2006 WL 769753, at 
*1–3 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2006) (denying summary judgment to employer where evidence 
proffered by male plaintiff that woman was hired to cure the underutilization of women in 
the job category); Travers v. City of Newton, No. Civ.A.04-12635 RWZ, 2005 WL 3008660, 
at *3–4 (D. Mass. Nov. 9, 2005) (granting summary judgment to the plaintiff where the 
defendant continued to adhere to race-conscious hiring under an AAP even after parity was 
achieved). 
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proof under the McDonnell Douglas standard and, as a result, are more 
likely to be sustained.77 
B.   Tying Compensation to Diversity Goals 
The practice of tying executive or partner compensation to diversity 
goals, while promoted by some within the legal profession, carries a danger 
of liability under Title VII.78  In particular, employers can incur liability 
under Title VII if these compensation practices are viewed as impermissibly 
injecting the unlawful consideration of race, ethnicity, and/or gender into an 
employer’s decision making.  In Frank v. Xerox Corp.,79 Xerox adopted a 
balanced workforce initiative (BWF) to “insur[e] that all racial and gender 
groups were proportionately represented at all levels of the company.”80  
Black employees sued Xerox alleging that the BWF resulted in unlawful 
discrimination against black employees, who were determined to be 
overrepresented in certain job categories.81  In reversing summary judgment 
for the employer, the Fifth Circuit held that the BWF was an AAP and that, 
unless the BWF was lawful, evidence that Xerox operated pursuant to the 
BWF in making the challenged employment decisions would constitute 
direct evidence of unlawful discrimination.82  The court further held that 
evidence that managers were evaluated and compensated on how well they 
complied with the goals and objectives of the BWF could be considered in 
determining whether Xerox managers likely operated pursuant to the BWF 
in making the challenged employment decisions.83  Thus, the practice of 
tying management performance evaluations and/or compensation to 
numerical hiring goals increased Xerox’s exposure to liability under Title 
VII. 
However, holding managers accountable for supporting the employer’s 
diversity commitment, and evaluating them on that basis, is not per se 
unlawful.  For example, Xerox stands in contrast to the outcome and 
reasoning in Coppinger v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.84  In Coppinger, the white, 
male plaintiff alleged that Wal-Mart engaged in unlawful discrimination 
when it promoted a Hispanic female over him.85  In support of his claim of 
 
 77. AAPs that do not involve the conscious consideration of race, ethnicity, and/or 
gender, and do not seek to achieve a particular numerical representation within the 
workforce, are more likely to be sustained under the McDonnell Douglas burden. See, e.g., 
Mlynczak v. Bodman, 442 F.3d 1050, 1058–59 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming summary 
judgment for the employer where the AAP was only designed to expand the pool of 
candidates, not permit race/gender preference in hiring or selection). 
 78. See supra note 11. 
 79. 347 F.3d 130 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 80. Id. at 133. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 137. 
 83. Id. 
 84. No. 3:07cv458/MCR/MD, 2009 WL 3163211 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2009); see also 
Bajor v. Wal-Mart Corp., No. 08-12401, 2010 WL 779240, at *6–8 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 8, 
2010) (granting summary judgment to the employer on a reverse discrimination claim, 
finding no evidence that managers had their bonuses reduced for failing to meet goals). 
 85. Coppinger, 2009 WL 3163211, at *1–2. 
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pretext under the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 
framework, he asserted that, despite Wal-Mart’s assertions that the woman 
chosen had superior qualifications, Wal-Mart’s diversity policy and 
practices were the real reason for his non-selection.86  He pointed in 
particular to two aspects of the diversity policy as motivating the unlawful 
promotion decision:  (1) diversity placement goals and (2) the evaluation of 
managers on their good faith efforts to support diversity.87  As to the latter, 
the plaintiff asserted that managers’ evaluations were based, in part, on their 
achievement of the diversity placement goals.88  However, in rejecting this 
evidence as proof of pretext, the court reasoned that, “[a]lthough ten percent 
of a manager’s job evaluation was based on attending one annual diversity 
event,” no evidence was presented demonstrating that managers were 
“influenced by [the diversity] policies” in making the challenged 
employment decisions.89 
These cases demonstrate that, while tying executive performance and 
compensation to diversity goals is not per se unlawful under Title VII, 
doing so may carry an increased risk of liability for the employer if an 
employee can demonstrate that the incentives under the compensation 
policy caused a decision maker to impermissibly consider race, ethnicity, 
and/or gender when making a hiring, promotion, or termination decision. 
C.   Affinity Groups/ERGs 
Affinity Groups or Employee Resource Groups (ERGs) are an 
increasingly common feature of workplace diversity efforts.90  These 
programs often serve as a valuable resource for employees and generally 
will not subject employers to Title VII liability in the absence of some other 
proof of discriminatory conduct by the employer.91  However, if ERGs 
operate as a pathway to leadership, rather than merely fostering mutual 
support among employees and/or providing targeted training opportunities, 
they should be open to all employees, lest they increase an employer’s risk 
of liability under Title VII for failing to provide equal access to resources 
 
 86. Id. at *6. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at *6–7. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Deborah L. Rhode, From Platitude to Priorities:  Diversity and Gender Equality 
in Law Firms, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1041, 1069 (2011). 
 91. Compare Moranski v. Gen. Motors Corp., 433 F.3d 537, 541–42 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that a failure to permit a Christian affinity group was not unlawful where no 
religious groups permitted); Filozof v. Monroe Comm. Coll., 583 F. Supp. 2d 393, 403–04 
(W.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that providing minorities and women with faculty development 
opportunities was “de minimis” and did not constitute disparate treatment), with Sinio v. 
McDonald’s Corp., No. 04 C 4161, 2007 WL 869553 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2007) (finding 
existence of African American employee resource group, when combined with other 
evidence of more favorable treatment of African Americans, sufficient to raise triable issue 
of fact on Asian American employee’s disparate treatment claim). 
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bearing directly on employees’ opportunities for advancement and 
promotion.92 
D.   Diversity Statements 
The most common practice among employers committed to workplace 
diversity is publication of a diversity statement.  These statements are often 
printed and published in various forms that are made available to both 
employees and the public.93  In addition to publishing these statements in 
writing, these statements are often reinforced by leaders in remarks, both 
formal and informal, with employees, administrators, and even external 
stakeholders.94  Although these diversity statements are likely to be cited in 
cases alleging reverse discrimination, they are very unlikely to constitute 
actionable proof of unlawful discrimination in the absence of a direct 
connection between the diversity statement and the challenged employment 
action.95  In fact, diversity statements that are neither made by the relevant 
decision maker, nor connected to the challenged employment action, are 
most likely to constitute “stray comments/remarks” under Title VII and 
cannot serve as the basis for legal liability.96  Moreover, general statements 
 
 92. See Sinio, 2007 WL 869553 (finding that the existence of an African American 
employee resource group, which was designed to help them achieve promotions, could 
support Asian American employee’s claim for disparate treatment). 
 93. Examples include diversity statements on the employer’s webpage, diversity 
brochures that might be distributed to prospective employees and others, and some 
employers even produce diversity reports containing detailed information about the 
employer’s efforts to promote workplace diversity.  All of these would qualify as “diversity 
statements.” 
 94. See supra note 11 for a discussion of these external stakeholders. 
 95. See, e.g., Johnson v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 502 F. App’x 523, 535 (6th Cir. 
2012) (“[S]tatements reflecting a desire to improve diversity do not equate to direct evidence 
of unlawful discrimination.”); Bissett v. Beau Rivage Resorts, 442 F. App’x 148, 152–153 
(5th Cir. 2011) (finding that a diversity policy did not support an inference of discrimination 
where the policy stated that the employer “‘values diversity and considers it an important 
and necessary tool that will enable [the employer] to maintain a competitive edge,’ and that 
the employer ‘is committed to maintaining a workforce that reflects the diversity of the 
community’”); Mlynczak v. Bodman, 442 F.3d 1050, 1057–58 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that 
comments not connected to hiring nor made by a decision maker were insufficient to 
establish discrimination); Harkola v. Energy E. Util. Shared Svs., No. 09-CV-6318 (MAT), 
2011 WL 3476265, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2011) (finding that a general diversity policy 
was insufficient to raise an inference of discrimination); Opsatnik v. Norfolk S. Corp., No. 
06-81, 2008 WL 763745, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2008) (holding that pointing to the 
defendant’s diversity policy, without more, is not sufficient evidence of discrimination); 
Keating v. Paulson, 2007 WL 3231437, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2007) (holding that a 
statement by one manager that “he used the announcement of the vacancy as a means of 
addressing [diversity] concerns . . . by itself . . . is insufficient to establish the requisite intent 
to discriminate”); Jones v. Bernanke, 493 F. Supp. 2d 18, 29 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[A]n 
employer’s statement that it is committed to diversity ‘if expressed in terms of creating 
opportunities for employees of different races and both genders . . . is not proof of 
discriminatory motive with respect to any specific hiring decision.  Indeed, it would be 
difficult to find today a company of any size that does not have a diversity policy.’” (quoting 
Bernstein v. St. Paul Cos., 134 F. Supp. 2d 730, 739 n.12 (D. Md. 2001))). 
 96. See, e.g., Plumb v. Potter, 212 F. App’x 472, 477–78 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding stray 
comments in support of diversity not direct evidence of discrimination). But see Murray v. 
Vill. of Hazel Crest, No. 06 C 1372, 2011 WL 382694, at *4–6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2011) 
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in support of diversity have been found to constitute neither direct evidence 
of discrimination, nor to raise an inference of discrimination sufficient to 
rebut an employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory business reason for a 
challenged employment action.97  In fact, such general statements in 
support of diversity have been viewed favorably by courts as a 
demonstration of the employer’s commitment to equal opportunity.98  
Consequently, diversity statements, by themselves and when unconnected 
to an individual employment decision, present very little, if any, risk of 
legal liability under Title VII. 
E.   Tiebreakers 
Given the permissive use of race as a “plus factor” in the college and 
university admissions context, including in an effort to increase student 
body diversity as recognized by the Supreme Court in Grutter, the question 
is often posed whether such plus factor or “tiebreaker” considerations are 
permitted in the employment context under Title VII.99  An analysis of the 
decided Title VII diversity cases suggests that consideration of race, 
ethnicity, and/or gender in making employment decisions, unless done 
pursuant to a valid AAP, carries a substantial risk of liability under Title 
VII and may only be permissible, if at all, as a tiebreaker when two 
candidates are virtually indistinguishable or so closely matched on objective 
qualifications that the selection decision is purely subjective and not subject 
to second-guessing by the court.100 
 
(holding that statements by the mayor that he wanted an African American promoted and 
more diversity in his administration generally, when combined with evidence of an AAP and 
testimony that race was considered in the decision making, were sufficient to constitute 
direct evidence of unlawful discrimination); Groesch v. City of Springfield, No. 04-3162, 
2006 WL 3842085, at *10 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 2006) (finding that, while “statements relating 
to the City’s increased efforts to recruit minorities in the Police Department are not direct 
evidence of discriminatory intent,” they could provide circumstantial evidence where other 
evidence also supports inference of discrimination), rev’d on other grounds, 635 F.3d 1020 
(7th Cir. 2011); White v. Alcoa, Inc., No. 3:04-CV-78 RLY/WGH, 2006 WL 769753 at *1–
2 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 27, 2006) (holding that the plaintiff was entitled to submit evidence to the 
jury where reasons for hiring a female over the plaintiff were “unconvincing” and further 
that the “HR Manager . . . advised . . . that if there was an opportunity to hire a qualified 
female, they should do so”). 
 97. See supra note 97. 
 98. See Groesch, 2006 WL 3842085, at *11 (“Having a racially diverse [workforce] is a 
worthy goal.”); Bullen v. Chaffinch, 336 F. Supp. 2d 342, 348 (D. Del. 2004) (“[A] 
generalized effort to achieve more minority representation in the [workforce] . . . may be 
admirable.”). 
 99. See Estlund, supra note 50, at 219 (suggesting that employers could defend race-
conscious hiring based on business justifications); Shin & Gulati, supra note 46, at 1049 
(predicting that the Supreme Court would soon consider the possibility of whether an interest 
in diversity might justify race-conscious action under Title VII). But see Rhode, supra note 
90, at 1068–69 (questioning “how far [the Grutter] rationale would extend to employment 
contexts”). 
 100. See Mlynczak, 442 F.3d at 1054 (“Race or sex may be considered only in the 
unlikely event that two candidates are so equally qualified that there is no other meaningful 
distinction between them.”); Coppinger v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:07cv458/MCR/MD, 
2009 WL 3163211, at *8 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2009) (finding that the fact that an employer 
bases a hiring or promotion decision on purely subjective criteria will rarely if ever prove 
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In structuring hiring and selection processes, therefore, it is important to 
ensure that, unless employment decisions are being made pursuant to a 
valid AAP, decision makers refrain from considering race, ethnicity, and/or 
gender in selecting candidates for hire or promotion.  Instead, selection 
decisions should be made on the basis of objective and/or subjective 
considerations about the candidates’ relative credentials and 
qualifications.101  When selection decisions are made on these bases, they 
are most likely to withstand challenge under Title VII.  This is particularly 
true, even when selection decisions are based on nominal differences in 
credentials or qualifications, or even entirely subjective considerations, 
because courts are loathe to second guess the decisions of employers when 
they involve no apparent consideration of such impermissible factors as 
race, ethnicity, or gender.102  This limitation on the consideration of race, 
ethnicity, and/or gender in the hiring/selection process can be contrasted 
with the consideration of race, ethnicity, and/or gender in the recruitment 
process. 
F.   Expanded Recruitment—The “Rooney Rule” 
Although expanded recruitment and outreach to women and minority 
applicants are often required components of formal AAPs, they are also 
common features of less formal diversity programs.103  To the extent that 
these recruitment and outreach efforts are aimed at ensuring that women 
and minority candidates are well represented among those considered for 
 
pretext under Title VII); Maples v. City of Columbia, No. 3:07-3568-CMC-JRM, 2009 WL 
483818, at *6 n.6 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 2009) (finding that, where a plaintiff asserts job 
qualifications that are similar or only slightly superior to those of the person eventually 
selected, the promotion decision remains vested in the sound business judgment of the 
employer). But see Dietz v. Baker, 523 F. Supp. 2d 407 (D. Del. 2007) (denying summary 
judgment to the defendant where a triable issue existed as to whether it may use race as a 
“plus factor” to support operational need and whether its use was narrowly tailored); White, 
2006 WL 769753, at *2–3 (finding the employer not entitled to summary judgment where 
the human resources manager advised an HR employee that she should hire a qualified 
female if the opportunity arose and told another manager to hire a female applicant over a 
more highly qualified male). 
 101. Overly subjective considerations may operate to the disadvantage of women and 
minorities in the selection process, thus giving rise to disparate impact and/or disparate 
treatment claims, and so ought to be limited in their use. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 509 
F.3d 1168, 1180 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that subjective criteria for promotion and 
compensation decisions could support liability for disparate impact), rev’d on other grounds, 
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 102. See Opsatnik v. Norfolk S. Corp., No. 06-81, 2008 WL 763745, at *10 (W.D. Pa. 
2008) (“[W]e do not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business 
decisions.” (quoting Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 332 (3d Cir. 
1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted))).  Critics might argue that 
this standard allows employers to engage in subterfuge to mask the real motives for their 
selection decisions.  This deferential standard also operates in favor of employers when they 
are accused of engaging in unlawful discrimination against women and minorities rather than 
in their favor. See Martin, supra note 14, at 368.  There is no reason to distinguish between 
these two circumstances in assuming employers are engaged in suppressing their real 
motives nor to apply differing standards of proof. 
 103. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-2 (2014) (requiring affirmative recruitment plans); see also supra 
note 10 and accompanying text (discussing voluntary recruitment efforts). 
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hiring and promotion opportunities, they are among the most legally 
defensible practices when challenged under Title VII.104 
In fact, expanded recruitment and outreach is the practice most often 
encouraged as a part of the legal profession’s commitment to diversity.105  
It is also a practice that, while it carries minimal legal risk, can generate 
demonstrable results when implemented effectively.106  One of the most 
frequently cited examples of the efficacy of expanded recruitment and 
outreach from diversity hiring programs is the National Football League’s 
(NFL) Rooney Rule.107  Some commentators even have encouraged legal 
employers to adopt the Rooney Rule as a part of their own diversity 
commitments.108  Even if legal employers do not formally adopt the 
Rooney Rule as a part of their recruitment and hiring practices, 
understanding how and why the Rooney Rule works, and in particular why 
it helps shield employers from legal liability under Title VII, might help 
inform the development of more effective and legally defensible 
recruitment and hiring practices. 
The Rooney Rule was adopted by the NFL in 2003 in response to public 
criticism about the dearth of minority head coaches.109  The Rooney Rule 
requires that NFL teams expand their recruitment of and outreach to 
minorities, and in particular requires that all teams interview at least one 
minority candidate for each head coaching or front office position.110  This 
effort has been widely lauded for increasing the number of minority head 
coaches from one in 2002 (just before the rule was adopted) to an all-time 
 
 104. See Mlynczak, 442 F.3d at 1053–54, 1061 (finding that an AAP that expanded the 
employer’s applicant pool but did not permit preference in hiring was not sufficient to 
establish discrimination); Rogers v. Haley, 421 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1366 (M.D. Ala. 2006) 
(“[W]hile ADOC may have operated an ‘expanded’ recruitment program . . . there is no 
evidence that it has operated a program that excluded . . . white applicants.”); Bullen v. 
Chaffinch, 336 F. Supp. 2d 342, 348 (D. Del. 2004) (“[A] generalized effort to achieve more 
minority representation . . . does not prove . . . that a quota was established.  In fact, under 
certain circumstances such an effort may be admirable.”). 
 105. See supra note 10. 
 106. See infra notes 107, 111–12 and accompanying text. 
 107. See, e.g., N. Jeremi Duru, Call in the Feds:  Title VI As a Diversifying Force in the 
Collegiate Head Football Coaching Ranks, 2 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 143, 148–49 
(2012) (touting the success of the NFL’s Rooney Rule in increasing the diversity of head 
coaches); see also Brian W. Collins, Tackling Unconscious Bias in Hiring Practices:  The 
Plight of the Rooney Rule, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 870 (2007) (explaining the basis for the 
Rooney Rule’s “uncharted success”).  The Rooney Rule, so named for Pittsburgh Steelers’ 
owner Dan Rooney, who was its driving force, was adopted by the NFL in 2003 following 
allegations by high-profile plaintiffs’ attorneys Cyrus Mehri and Johnnie Cochran that the 
hiring and termination of head coaches in the NFL was racially discriminatory. See Duru, 
supra, at 147–48. At the time the Rooney Rule was adopted there was one minority head 
coach in the NFL, within two years there were six, and as of 2011 there were an all-time 
high number of eight minority head coaches in the NFL, including five that had made Super 
Bowl appearances. Id. at 147–48 & n.21. 
 108. Allegheny Cnty. Bar Ass’n, Could a Variation of the NFL’s Rooney Rule Work for 
Law Firms?, LAW. J., 2012, at 1. 
 109. See Duru, supra note 107, at 143.  This was seen as a particularly troubling 
phenomenon given the significant concentration of minority players (70 percent) in the 
league. Id. at 147. 
 110. Id. at 143. 
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high of eight in 2011.111  The reason why the Rooney Rule works is 
because it allows teams to expand the pool of candidates from which they 
select coaches, but the reason why it is lawful is because ultimately the 
coaches are selected on the basis of their credentials, not their color.112  
Expanding the pool of candidates to include more women and racial/ethnic 
minorities would similarly allow legal employers to identify both more 
diverse candidates and possibly those with a broader range of talents, skills, 
and abilities than might otherwise be identified when relying on narrow 
recruitment strategies.  Selecting candidates from among this expanded 
pool on the basis of their unique skills, abilities, experiences, and perceived 
contributions, rather than on the basis of prohibited characteristics, is what 
helps shield the decision from legal liability.113  This results in a win-win 
for legal employers, who are able to expand their diversity while also 
minimizing their legal risk. 
III.   REDEEMING MCDONNELL DOUGLAS 
Title VII’s McDonnell Douglas standard has often been criticized for its 
failure to protect women and racial/ethnic minorities from workplace 
discrimination.114  This critique focuses largely on the very low burden (of 
production) applicable to employers at the second stage of the McDonnell 
 
 111. Id. at 148–49 (“[T]he rule has been more effective in expanding NFL head coaching 
opportunities than any other equal opportunity initiative in league history.”).  It should be 
noted that this recruiting and hiring effort has not come at the expense of talent.  Five of the 
eight head coaches in the league as of 2011 had made Super Bowl appearances in the 
previous five years. Id. at 148. 
 112. Id. at 149.  Expanding the pool of candidates allows the teams to identify more 
candidates than might otherwise be identified using narrow recruitment practices.  Within 
this expanded pool there are likely to be talents that had previously gone unnoticed. 
 113. See DeBiasi v. Charter Cnty. of Wayne, 537 F. Supp. 2d 903, 922 (E.D. Mich. 2008) 
(crediting defendant’s assertion that the woman selected was more qualified than plaintiff, 
and reasoning that, “in the case in which there is little or no other probative evidence of 
discrimination, to survive summary judgment the rejected applicant’s qualifications must be 
so significantly better than the successful applicant’s qualifications that no reasonable 
employer would have chosen the latter applicant over the former” (quoting Bender v. 
Hecht’s Dep’t Stores, 455 F.3d 612, 627 (6th Cir. 2006)); Plumb v. Potter, 212 F. App’x 
472, 480 (6th Cir. 2007) (rejecting evidence that the plaintiff was objectively more qualified 
for the promotion than the woman chosen, even where the plaintiff alleged that he had more 
managerial experience, more education and training, and a higher pay grade, finding that 
their “qualifications . . . were comparable, and [the employer] chose [the woman] based on 
her better interview and her superior performance during the temporary detail”); Jones v. 
Bernanke, 493 F. Supp. 2d 18, 31 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding that the plaintiff had not even 
offered a prima facie case of discrimination where, notwithstanding the allegations by the 
plaintiff that he was more qualified than the woman chosen, “this [was] a situation in which 
the defendant chose between two equally qualified candidates,” and therefore the plaintiff 
did not raise any inference of discrimination); see also Mlynczak v. Boldman, 442 F.3d 
1050, 1059 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[W]here an employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reason for 
its employment decision is that it selected the most qualified candidate, evidence of the 
applicants’ competing qualifications does not constitute evidence of pretext unless those 
differences are so favorable to the plaintiff that there can be no dispute among reasonable 
persons of impartial judgment that the plaintiff is clearly better qualified for the position at 
issue.” (citations omitted)). 
 114. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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Douglas burden-shifting framework, when the employer need only proffer 
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason for taking the 
challenged employment action, as compared to the very high burden (of 
proof) plaintiffs must satisfy at the third stage of this burden-shifting 
framework, when they must demonstrate that this reason is actually a 
pretext for unlawful discrimination, or must otherwise offer direct proof of 
the employer’s discriminatory motive.115  However, it is precisely these 
burdens that operate to the advantage of employers when defending their 
diversity efforts from reverse discrimination challenges.  Given the 
increasing hostility by courts to traditional discrimination claims, litigation 
has become a less effective strategy for advancing the interests of women 
and racial/ethnic minorities in the workplace.116  Conversely, voluntary 
efforts by employers to improve workplace diversity are growing.117  As 
these efforts have grown, however, they too have encountered resistance, 
especially in the form of reverse discrimination litigation.118  In order to 
sustain and promote these efforts, including within the legal profession, it is 
necessary that they be structured in legally defensible ways and that 
employers are aware of the most effective legal strategies for defending 
these efforts.  For the reasons discussed herein, Title VII’s McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting framework may ironically provide that strategy, 
redeeming Title VII as a vehicle for the protection of women and 
racial/ethnic minorities and for ensuring their effective participation in the 
workplace. 
 
 115. See supra notes 23–31 and accompanying text. 
 116. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
 117. See Moranski v. Gen. Motors Corp., 433 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Employer-
sponsored diversity initiatives have become increasingly popular.”). 
 118. See supra note 50 (noting that forty of forty-four cases challenging diversity efforts 
have been reverse discrimination cases). 
